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DAISY'S ORIGINALS, INC. v. NLRB: NEW RESTRICTIONS
ON THE USE OF BARGAINING ORDERS UNDER THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Prior to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Daisy's Originals, Inc. v.
NLRB,' the National Labor Relations Board and courts consis-
tently held that an employer whose unfair labor practices caused
the defection of workers from an incumbent union had to
continue to bargain with that union, even though in fact the
employer's practices may have caused the union to lose the
support of a majority of workers. 2 The supporting rationale was
not complex. It grew partially out of a desire to prevent an
employer from benefiting from misconduct and partially out of
a felt need to let a victorious union enjoy the fruits of its labors.
3
Once a bargaining relationship was established-either by Board
certification 4 or by voluntary recognition 5-an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of the union's majority status was recognized for a
"reasonable length of time,' '6 ordinarily one year.7 This pre-
sumption of majority status continued after the "reasonable
length of time" had elapsed, although then the presumption
became rebuttable.8 After that point, to burst the presumption
and licitly refuse to bargain, an employer had to be able to assert
a good faith doubt of the union's majority status, supported by
such firm evidentiary foundation as a strike call by the union
without the substantial support of union employees, 9 or a direct
employee request to the employer or Board that the union no
'468 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1972).
2 Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v.
NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); NLRB v. A.W. Thompson, Inc., 449 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972); NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 413 F.2d 112
(9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Movie Star, Inc., 361 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1966); NLRB v.
PoultRy Enterprises, Inc., 207 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1953).
7ee note 12 infra.
The Board is empowered to hold representation elections and certify the results
upon a petition filed by either the employees, the employer, or the union under § 9(c) of
the Labor Management Relations Act [hereinafter the Act], 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1970).
Id. § 159(c)(1).
5 A union need not be certified to invoke a bargaining obligation on the part of the
employer under the Act. It may establish its majority through other means, usually by
possession of cards signed by a majority of the employees authorizing the union to
represent them for collective bargaining purposes. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395
U.S. 575, 597 (1969). An employer may force an election though, if he expresses a"good faith" doubt of the union's majority. See id. at 594; notes 16-17 infra &
accompanying text.
6 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98-99 (1954).7 Id. at 98. The reasonable period might be extended upon a showing of a lack of
employer food faith during the certification year. NLRB v. Little Rock Downtowner,
Inc., 014 F.2d 1084, 1091 (8th Cir. 1969).8 See, e.g., id.; NLRB v. Gulfmont Hotel Co., 362 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1966).
9 E.g., Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 28 L.R.R.M. 1362 (195 1) (good
faith doubt was created by circumstances under which a majority of employees returned
to work during strike which union desired to continue). Cf. NLRB v. Gulfmont Hotel
Co., 362 F.2d 588, 589 (5th Cir. 1966) (doubt must rest on reasonable basis, not
unfounded speculation or subjective state of mind).
207
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:207
longer represent the employees in collective bargaining. 10 While
the presence of good faith doubt was to be assessed in the light
of all the circumstances, good faith was emphatically not to be
recognized in the context of employer antiunion activities." The
weakness of such unfair labor practices, or the directness with
which the unfair labor practices contributed to the union's
demise, were deemed irrelevant.1
2
The foregoing precedent seems a casualty of the recent
decision in Daisy's, in which unfair labor practices occurred
simultaneously with employee decertification petitions and were
apparently acknowledged' 3 by the Fifth Circuit as part of a
calculated effort to undermine an incumbent union's bargaining
status. These actions were deemed insufficient to warrant en-
forcement of a bargaining order.
1. THE FACTUAL SETTING
For fourteen years Daisy's Originals, a Miami corporation,
recognized and bargained with Local 415 of the I.L.G.W.U.
Then, in January 1968, allegedly pursuant to a "sophisticated
and subtle plan to undermine the union,"'4 management sent a
letter to each employee pointing out that a certain sum had been
placed in trust with the union for payment as fringe benefits to
'"E.g., NLRB v. H.P. Wasson & Co., 422 F.2d 558, 561 (7th Cir. 1970) (good faith
doubt created by results of noncoercive employer poll of employees showing their desire
to be rid of the union, large employee turnover, and decrease in union checkoff cards).
" See, e.g., Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 673, 28 L.R.R.M. 1362,
1366 (1951):
There must, first of all, have been some reasonable grounds for believing that
the union had lost its majority status .... And, secondly, the majority issue
must not have been raised by the employer in a context of illegal antiunion
activities, or other conduct by the employer aimed at causing disaffection from
the union or indicating that in raising the majority -issue the employer was
merely seeking to gain time in which to undermine the union.
12 An employer's unfair labor practices and the union's loss of majority did not have
to be tightly connected. It was felt that a bargaining order might be appropriate even in
the absence of proof that the unfair practices directly caused the loss of majority. See
NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 413 F.2d 112, 115 (9t Cir. 1969), in which an allegedly
speculative unfair labor practice was deemed sufficient to warrant enforcement of a
bargaining order. See also General Elec. Co., Battery Prod., Capacitor Dep't v. NLRB,
400 F.2d 713, 730 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 904 (1969); Sakrete of N. Cal.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 902, 909 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
It appeared reasonable to assume that, in the presence of any unfair labor practices,
a decline in union support did not reflect the free will of employees. See NLRB v. A.W.
Thompson, Inc., 449 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 413
F.2d 112 (9th Cir. 1969). Moreover, even if a bargaining order were foreseeably to
deprive some employees of their § 7 freedom of choice, see note 19 infra, it was justified
on dual grounds: "the refusal to let an employer benefit by his own wrongs and.., the
insistence that a union which has won the right to bargain is allowed to enjoy that right."
General Elec. Co., Battery Prod., Capacitor Dep't v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 713, 730 (5th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 904 (1969) (footnote omitted); see Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB,
321 U.S. 702, 704-05 (1944). Finally, it was felt unreasonable to require the Board to
plumb the primary motives of individuals who had recanted union membership to
separate those who were exercising free will from those who were subtly coerced into
recantation. Cf. J.P. Stevens & Co., Gulistan Div. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1971).
i2 See note 23 infra.
24 Daisy's Originals, Inc. v. NLRB, 468 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir. 1972).
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union and nonunion employees alike. It adverted to rumors
allegedly circulating in the shop that the union would not
disburse these funds to nonunion workers and concluded that
such union practices were unfair and unlawful and that they
ought to be reported. In fact, the rumors were not only untrue;
they did not exist. But the employer's letter had the foreseeable
effect of creating serious employee apprehension as to the
union's integrity. 15
Subsequently, on February 23, while antiunion disestab-
lishment petitions were circulated by certain employees,'16 man-
agement held a meeting of all employees at which its representa-
tive distributed a booklet describing shop work regulations and
pointing to special benefits available only to nonunion em-
ployees. Another meeting was held March 8, at which time a
Spanish language edition of the booklet was provided to
Spanish-speaking employees.' 7 At this meeting the employer
representative discussed rumors of union misconduct and made
clear that an employee wishing to receive maximum benefits
should indicate his preference for no union.' 8 Within ten days, a
majority of employees indicated their desire to disestablish the
union; on March 18, the employer advised the union of its loss
of majority status and refused to bargain further.
II. BOARD REFLECTIONS AND COURT REACTIONS
Scrutinizing the union complaints which quickly ensued, the
Board found that the actions of Daisy's Originals had interfered
with employee free choice' 9 and thus violated section 8(a)(1) of
the Labor Management Relations Act;20 it held that the em-
15 Though in fact union stewards were soon barraged with such employee questions
as "'How do we get our money?'" id. at 496, the letter itself was not found an unfair
labor practice, id. at 497; and, because of a defect in the trial examiner's hearing process
(Daisy s was not allowed cross-examination of a key witness), the court dedlined to
enforce an order based in part on a finding that no rumors existed. Id. at 498.
16 It was at this point that management was dearly placed on notice of the petitions.
Id. at 497. Thus, even if the employer had no direct role in initiating the petitions,
subsequent misconduct was committed with knowledge of its possible fruits.
rDaisy's work force was primarily Cuban and Spanish-speaking. Id. at 497.
18 The trial examiner found the "iron fist in the velvet glove" manifesting itself at
this meeting. Id. at 497-98. This refers to a form of thinly veired threat that benefits will
be less with the union and is usually, as in Daisy's, violative of § 8(a)(1) of the Act. See
NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) (footnote omitted):
The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a
fist inside the velvet glove. Employees are not likely to miss the inference that
the source of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future
benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged.
19 Section 7 of the Act provides the basic employee rights:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities . ...
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
20 Section 8(a)(1) proscribes violations of § 7 rights, making it an unfair labor
1973]
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ployer interference directly and indirectly undermined the
union's majority status and prevented the employer from assert-
ing the union's loss of majority in defense of his refusal to
bargain.2 Thus, it found that Daisy's Originals had improperly
refused to bargain with the legitimate representative of its
employees,22 and as a remedy for the unfair labor practices, it
ordered the employer both to cease and desist from interfering
with the employees' rights and to bargain with the union.
The Fifth Circuit accepted the Board's findings of section
8(a)(1) violations23 and enforced the cease-and-desist order, but
denied the Board's petition for enforcement of its bargaining
order,24 basing its decision on a novel application of established
practice tot an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
the rights guaranteed in section [7] .... I d. § 158(a)(1) (1970).See note 18 supa.
21 Daisy's Originals, Inc., 187 N.L.R.B. 251, 75 L.R.R.M. 1561 (1970).
22 Section 8(a)(5) stipulates that it shall be an unfair labor practice fdr an employer
"to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees . 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
23 Although the court's holding in Daisy's Originals seems clear, future lawyers and
courts may succeed in avoiding the results in the case by exploiting an ambiguity in the
court's opinion with regard to essential facts. At the outset, the court seems to accept the
Board's finding that the employer's unfair labor practices were directed at the subtle
instigation of a repudiation of the union. 468 F.2d at 497-98. Later in the opinion,
however, the court suggests that the unfair labor practices occurred after the union's
demise and did not hasten the union downfall. Id. at 502. This latter language could
provide support for an argument that the Daisy's employer actually had an evidentiary
good faith doubt of the union majority, untainted by unfair labor practices. Thus, the
decision would merely apply Gissel standards in a case in which the employer commits
unfair practices after a licit refusal to bargain. This application of Gissel standards has
been previously approved; see Ingress-Plastene, Inc. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 542, 546 (7th
Cir. 1970); Fremont Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB, 436 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1970). This
interpretation, however, conflicts sharply with most other language in the opinion,
indicating that at least some unfair labor practices preceded the union's loss of majority.
See note 16 supra; 468 F.2d at 497-98.
For an excellent example of an attempt by the Board to narrowly limit Daisy's
Originals, see Brief for Petitioner at 14, NLRB v. Medical Manors, Inc., No. 17-1763 (9th
Cir. Apr. 27, 1973). In Medical Manors, Inc., 201 N.L.R.B. No. 27, 82 L.R.R.M. 1222
(Jan. 10, 1973), an employer implemented a change in his employees' health insurance
coverage unilaterally and without notice to an incumbent union. This action was found
by the Board to have directly caused the circulation of decertification petitions and an
eventual loss of union majority. In seeking enforcement of a bargaining order, the
Board called attention to statutory policies ignored by Daisy's Originals, but emphasized
that the Fifth Circuit's "actual holding" had only been that "in an incumbent union
situation an employer should not lose his defense of a good faith doubt where the unfair
labor practices "do not tend to dissipate the union's majority' .... Brief for Petitioner at
14, No. 17-1763.
24 The Board has the power to petition the courts of appeals of the United States
for the enforcement of its orders and for injunctive relief. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
Under § 10(c), the Board has been ranted power to fashion remedies designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). The choice of remedy in
unfair.labor practice proceedings has repeatedly been held to be "peculiarly a matter for
administrative competence," Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941); see
International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 82 (1940). Thus the Board's
choice of a specific remedy has been sustained unless in excess of the Board's statutory
authority. E.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
In fact, the Board has been criticized at times for its failure to use this creative
power to its fullest extent. See Note, The Need for Creative Orders Under Section 10(c) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 69 (1963).
The remedy routinely chosen by the Board and accepted by the courts when an
employer's unfair labor practices have dissipated the union's majority and he has then
tried to use that dissipation as the basis of a good faith doubt of the union's majority
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doctrine. The court chose to disregard past practice2 5 and
applied instead a set of criteria previously developed by the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 2 6 In each of three
cases27 reviewed together in Gissel, a union attempted to or-
ganize the employees of previously nonunion employers, ob-
tained authorization cards from an employee majority, and was
then met by employer denials of the cards' validity and with
employer unfair labor practices that tended to undermine the
union's majority status and caused an election to be set aside, or
prevented the holding of fair elections. 28 The Board's response
in each case was to issue a bargaining order, even though no
election had been held in two of the cases and the employer had
won an election in the third.
In weighing the propriety of the Board's chosen remedy,
the Gissel court2 9 held that a bargaining order was appropriate
depending upon the circumstances and the severity of the
unfair labor practices, and divided the continuum of future
possibilities into three categories. First, where "outrageous" and
"pervasive" practices occurred, it held a bargaining order ap-
propriate without need of inquiry into the majority status of the
union. Second, it held that less pervasive, less extraordinary
employer misconduct which destroyed a previous union major-
ity sufficed to accord the Board discretion to issue a bargaining
order. Third, it held that minor, less extensive unfair labor
practices with a minimal impact on election machinery did not
warrant bargaining orders.
30
Daisy's saw an incumbent union's majority status dissipated;
Gissel involved only the dissipation of a new, unrecognized
union's majority. The Fifth Circuit recognized the factual dif-
ferences between the two cases but concluded that the policy
considerations in both cases were sufficiently similar that the
Gissel guidelines should control in each.31 The court reasoned
that an employer is under no less compelling a duty to bargain
with a fledgling union profferring a card majority than with an
incumbent union of long standing presenting a bargaining de-
mand. In each case, the court noted, the employer is faced with
an unfair labor practice charge should he refuse to bargain; in
status in violation of § 8(a)(5), see note 22 supra, is the issuance of a bargaining order, see
notes 2, 12 supra.25 See notes 2, 9-12 supra.
26 395 U.S. 575 (1969). See generally Note, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.: Bargaining
Orders and Employee Free Choice, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 318 (1970).
27 A fourth case reviewed in Gissel, Sinclair Company, was factually similar but
centered on the issue of employer free speech. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
575, 587-90, 616-20 (1969).28 1d. at 610.
29 See note 26 supra.
30395 U.S. at 613-15.
" See note 47 infra.
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each case, a "substantial good faith doubt of the union's
majority"32 is a defense to the charge. Thus, the court con-
cluded, an employer should not lose his good faith doubt
defense in either case when his unfair labor practices do not
prevent the holding of a representation election.
Examining the unfair labor practices committed by Daisy's
Originals, the Fifth Circuit found that they fell within the third
Gissel category,33 and it therefore refused to enforce the Board's
bargaining order. It indicated that the unfair labor practices had
not so impaired employee free choice that an election could not
be conducted, and held that the employee choice implicit in the
decertification petition should stand. Thus, the employer was
freed from his bargaining obligation.
34
III. THE AFTERMATH
Before Daisy's, an employer could avoid bargaining with an
incumbent union after the initial period of presumed majority
status only by expressing a good faith doubt35 or by winning a
decertification election.3 6 Daisy's quietly but significantly encour-
ages use of the former method and adds enormously to the
practical ability of the employer to unseat incumbent unions. It
allows an employer to commit minor unfair labor practices
which unsettle employees, undermine the union's majority, and
then enable the employer to piously express good faith doubt of
the union's majority. Once the employer has created a rational
basis for refusal to bargain, the union will be forced into a
position of inferiority and required to take new initiatives to
prove anew its majority status. The only chastisement that the
employer must suffer for this choice opportunity to oust a
troublesome union is a slap on the wrist, in the form of an order
to cease and desist from his unfair labor practices.
An employer who wishes to take advantage of this decision
must, of course, be careful not to commit violations within the
first or second Gissel categories, 37 for in either case a bargaining
3' 468 F.2d 493, 501 (citations omitted).
3" See text accompanying note 30 supra.
3' As the last contract ended May 31, 1968, Daisy's Originals, Inc., 187 N.L.R.B.
251, 75 L.R.R.M. 1561, 1562 (1970), the union had no further control over the
employer or employees; although after the decision the employees or union could, of
course, petition the Board for a certification election after a year had elapsed. See note 4
supra; note 51 infra.
See notes 9-12 supra & accompanying text.
36 A decertification election may be obtained by filing with the Board a petition
signed by 30% or more of the employees expressing their desire to no longer be
represented by the union. See 29 U.s.C. § 159(e) (1970).
The availability of such an election is qualified by several Board rules not relevant
here. For example, § 9(c)(3) of the Act bars another election for 12 months after the
holding of a valid election. Id. § 159(c)(3). Also, in certain circumstances a collective
bargainng contract will bar the holding of an election. See generally Freidin, The Board,
the Ban" and the Bargain, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 61 (1959); cf. note 4 supra; note 51 infra.
37See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
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order could issue at the Board's discretion.
38 The decision to
deny a bargaining order in Daisy's was predicated on the as-
sumption that employee free choice was still possible in that
factual setting; this would not have been the case in the presence
of more coercive unfair labor practices, the factor which led the
Gissel court to hold bargaining orders appropriate in some
situations.
3 9
Past cases applying the Gissel criteria to demands for recog-
nition by new unions provide the best guide to how far an
employer can go in committing unfair labor practices to under-
mine a union's majority status and then successfully refuse to
bargain on the basis of a "good faith doubt." Although Gissel is
itself a fairly recent decision, some general trends in its applica-
tion have already emerged. The most extreme case, one which
will always be subject to a bargaining order, is one in which the
employer discharges all employees when presented with a bar-
gaining demand by the union.40 Short of this vindictive be-
havior, the discharge of employees to discourage union
adherents,41 or the grant of wage increases to influence an
election's outcome,42 will generally result in the issuance of a
bargaining order when the union initially had a card majority.
Also, when an employer combines illicit employee interrogation
with threats to close the plant, discharge union sympathizers or
eliminate existing fringe benefits, a fair election will generally be
considered impossible and a bargaining order will issue if the
union initially had a card majority.43 On the other hand, illicit
interrogation by itself44 or illicit interrogation combined with
minor threats of reprisal4 5 or suggestion of greater benefits
without the union46 will generally not trigger a bargaining
order.
38 A bargaining order may issue at the Board's discretion in the second Gissel
category. In he first Gissel category, it appears that there is little or no discretion. 395
U.S. at 613-15. However, the latter situation is very rare and as a general rule the
issuance of a bargaining order will be at the Board's discretion.
39395 US 575 at 613-15.4 0 Beach "Rfg to., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 47, 77 L.R.R.M. 1716 (1971).
41 See NLRB-v. Tri-State Stores, Inc., 477 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1972j, cert. denied, 42
U.S.L.W. 3386 (U.S. Jan. 7, 1974); NLRB v. Sitton Tank Co., 467 F.2d 1371 (8th Cir.
1972); NLRB v. Medley Distilling Co., 453 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1971); Quaker Bakery
Mach. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 141, 81 L.R.R.M. 1003 (Aug. 21, 1972); W.T. Grant Co.,
195 N.L.R.B. No. 183, 79 L.R.R.M. 1670 (Mar. 22, 1972); United Elec. Co., 194
N.L.R.B. 665, 79 L.R.R.M. 1051 (1971).
42 See NLRB v. Colonial Knitting Corp., 464 F.2d 949 (3d Cir. 1972); NLRB v.
Tower Records, 79 L.R.R.M. 2736 (9th Cir., Jan. 21, 1972); Unarco Indus., 197
N.L.R.B. No. 76, 80 L.R.R.M. 1621 (June 14, 1972); WKRG-TV, Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. No.
34, 77 L.R.R.M. 1078 (Apr. 29, 1971).
43 See NLRB v. Juniata Packing Co., 464 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1972); Donahue
Beverages, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 84, 81 L.R.R.M. 1580 (Oct. 10, 1972). But see Dent
Poultry Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 426, 7b L.R.R.M. 155/ (19/1).
"See Action Advertising Co., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 79 L.R.R.M. 1455 (Feb. 28,
1972); Thomas Markets, 191 N.L.R.B. No. 75, 77 L.R.R.M. 1451 (June 21, 1971).
4 5 See Servico Protective Covers, Inc., 199 N.L.R.B. No. 160, 81 L.R.R.M. 1370 (Oct.
24, 1972).
"See Dent Poultry Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 426, 76 L.R.R.M. 1557 (1971).
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IV. ASSESSMENTS
The heart of the Fifth Ciruit's decision in Daisy's was an
assumption that an employer is under an equally compelling
duty to bargain with a fledgling and an incumbent union.47 This
much seems indisputably correct. But the court apparently
found identical requirements for good faith doubt sufficient to
support a refusal to bargain in either case, and ignored the.
recognition by past courts of two separate good faith standards.
To refuse to bargain with a new union, an employer has not in
the past been required to have any basis for his doubt;48 to
refuse to bargain with an incumbent union, however, courts
have required that an employer have evidentiary basis for his
doubt, a basis untainted by his own unfair labor practices. 49 This
key distinction has been recognized because the employer with
an incumbent union has either had or has voluntarily foregone
a fair election. While the presumption of union majority status
may no longer reflect the reality of employee desires, it has been
felt foolishly dangerous to allow that presumption to be washed
away in this setting, as there is considerable realistic danger that
it is the employer's unfair practices, and not employee desires,
which have precipitated the loss of majority. And there is equal
danger that allowing the presumption to be burst in the pres-
ence of employer misconduct will encourage new brinksmanship
in subtle employer propagandization and coercion.
The Daisy's result represents a theoretic victory for em-
ployee free choice; it hypothetically enables workers to exercise
their industrial franchise and cast off the yoke of a union grown
unresponsive or irresponsible. Yet, although Gissel found that
sufficiently tepid unfair labor practices do not destroy employee
free choice where an initial decision on unionism is at stake, an
incumbent union majority pragmatically justifies more scrupu-
lous protection of that industrial franchise. The fortuitous coin-
cidence of employee desires for disestablishment with employer
unfair labor practices directed against the incumbent union
suggest that the victory of employee free will may be illusory in
such a setting. Thus, even if one's primary concern is employee
self-determination, the long-recognized necessity for special
"laboratory conditions" 50 in the peculiar setting of an industrial
47 468 F.2d 493, at 501: "The facts of Gissel are certainly dissimilar, but the policy
considerations are not. A fledgling union's right to bargain in good faith is as strong as
the incumbent's of fourteen years." See notes 28-30 supra & accompanying text.
48 E.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 594 (1968):
Under the Board's current practice, an employer's good faith doubt is largely
irrelevant .... Thus, an employer can insist that a union go to an election,
regardless of his subjective motivation, so long as he is not guilty of misconduct;
he need give no affirmative reasons for rejecting a recognition request, and he
can demand an election with a simple "no comment" to the union.
4 See notes 11-12 supra & accompanying text.
5 0 See General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337, 1341 (1948):
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election, where subtle irrational forces and erroneous informa-
tion frequently weigh overheavily, supports the prophylactic
protection accorded existing union majorities in the past.
5 1
Moreover, the Daisy's situation involves considerations other
than and in competition with employee free choice. In a Gissel
setting the sole aim is to assure the employees' free choice of a
collective bargaining representative by the most reliable avail-
able method.52 The most generally reliable barometer of em-
ployee will is a representation election, and absent substantial
unfair labor practices, such an election should be held if any
party so -desires. Where an incumbent union is concerned, the
aim of assuring employee free choice remains, but has already
been followed in the union's original recognition, any may again
be followed in the future upon the showing of employee desire
for decertification unattended by employer unfair labor
practices. 53 Another strong competing policy which comes into
play, the promotion of industrial peace and stability, 54 requires
assurance of stability in existing collective bargaining
relationships. 55 This policy is endangered by the holding of
"In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which an
experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine
the uninhibited desires of the employees." Cf Dal-Tex Optical Co., Inc., 137 N.L.R.B.
1782, 50 L.R.R.M. 1489 (1962).
51 Of course, the situation may be imagined in which there is a coincidence between
employee desires for disestablishment, uninfluenced by employer conduct, and em-
ployer unfair labor practices. If this were the situation in Daisy's, it is clear that a
bargaining order would impinge upon employee free will. Apparently, issuance of the
bargaining order will prevent the holding of a decertification election for a full year. See
Mar-ac Poultry, 136 N.L.R.B. 785, 49 L.R.R.M. 1854 (1962); NLRB FIELD MANUAL
11730 (rev. ed. 1971). However, it seems clear under past practice, see notes 9-12 supra,
that if past unfair labor practices by Daisy's could be deemed purged by issuance of the
bargaining order sought, nothing would preclude the employer from raising a subse-
quent good faith dout of the union's ma ority-supported by evidence of employee
desire for disestablishment and unattended by new invidious practices-as a defense to a
subsequent refusal to bargain.
' 2 See NLRB v. Frick Co., 423 F.2d 1327, 1330-31 n.6 (3d Cir. 1970); Toy Silk Mills,
Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950). This policy is
openly declared in § 1 of the Act:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
' 3 See note 51 supra.
54 Experience has . . . demonstrated that certain practices by some labor
organizations, their officers, and members have the intent or the necessary
effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing the free flow of
goods in... commerce through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or
through concerted activities which impair the interest of the public in the free
flow of such commerce. The elimination of such practices is a necessary
condition to the assurance of the rights.herein guaranteed.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).55 5ee id.; NLRB v. Frick Co., 423 F.2d 1327, 1330-31 n.6 (3d Cir. 1970). See
generally Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REv.
1, 2-4 (1947).
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frequent, disruptive representation elections, and necessitates
that existing relationships be accorded a presumption of validity
to be dispelled only by good faith doubt supported by evidence
free of employer taint. 56
The decision in Daisy's, unfortunately, gives the employer
an opportunity, through the commission of insidious minor
unfair labor practices, to place incumbent unions on the defen-
sive, and possibly oust unions of marginal support. This oppor-
tunity will almost assuredly be taken by some employers, with
resulting union work stoppages and strikes in retaliation. An
employer who knows that he may be able to oust the union by
his own conduct after the initial period of presumed majority
status will be less willing than ever to bargain to reach an
agreement, and may decide to wait and take a chance on ousting
the union altogether.
V. CONCLUSION
Disregard in Daisy's of a time-honored distinction between
two good faith standards may do violence to the promotion of
industrial peace. The decision creates new hope for employers
who refuse to accept the advent of unionism and does little to
promote the right of free choice of employees which was
adequately protected before the decision. 57 A less destructive
approach to the protection of employee free choice would seem
to lie in further control of union and employer electioneering in
the organizational stage of union representation to assure an
intelligent, initial employee decision on the merits of unionism.
Beyond the organizational stage, the employee right of free
choice must not only be scrupulously protected from subtle
employer propagandization, but must as well be balanced
against a compelling goal of industrial harmony. Daisy's Origi-
nals, unfortunately, seems to have struck an incorrect balance.
6 Another circuit court came to this conclusion before the Daisy's Originals decision.
See NLRB v. Frick Co., 423 F.2d 1327, 1330-31 n.6 (1970).57
See notes 12, 35-36 supra & accompanying text.
